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The SPEECH Act’s Unfortunate Parochialism: 
Of Libel Tourism and Legitimate Pluralism 
MARK D. ROSEN* 
 
The recently enacted Securing the Protection of our Enduring and 
Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act or Act) provides 
that a foreign country’s defamation judgment is recognizable and enforceable in 
the United States only if the foreign court’s conclusion of defamation liability is 
consistent with American First Amendment doctrine. This Article argues that 
the Act’s refusal to credit any alternatives to the American approach to 
constitutionally protecting speech is problematically parochial. Foreign 
defamation judgments based on foreign laws that could not have been enacted by 
an American polity due to the First Amendment may be “Un-American,” but 
they cannot be unconstitutional. Nor would it be unconstitutional for an 
American court to enforce an Un-American foreign judgment. Whether such 
judgments should be enforced is a policy decision, and a wide range of 
approaches to foreign policy concludes that at least some Un-American 
judgments should be enforced. It follows that the SPEECH Act’s rule — that 
Un-American defamation judgments are categorically unenforceable — is 
wrongheaded.  
The political branches are better suited than courts, on both institutional and 
democratic grounds, to decide which Un-American judgments should be 
enforced. The SPEECH Act, however, demonstrates the dangers of 
formulating policies directly affecting other countries in the purely domestic 
institutional context of statute making. Rather, such decisions are best made in 
a setting in which all affected countries are present so that competing interests 
can be aired and differences can be negotiated. The Hague Conference’s past 
                                                          
* Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I thank Alan Lin, the Virginia Journal of 
International Law, and the J.B. Moore Society of International Law for running an absolutely 
outstanding symposium. I received excellent comments from conference participants as well as my 
fellow panel members. I also benefited greatly from discussions with Justyna Balcarczyk. 
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failure to adopt a convention addressing judgments does not mean that future 
agreement is not possible — an array of alternatives to the Hague Conference’s 
approach could be used to negotiate an agreement concerning the enforceability of 
foreign defamation judgments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The legislative history and preamble of the Securing the Protection of 
our Enduring and Established Constitution Heritage Act1 (the “SPEECH 
Act” or the “Act”) indicate that Congress intended to take aim at so called 
“libel tourism” — the filing of libel lawsuits, against U.S. authors and 
publishers, in foreign countries so that the foreign country’s pro-plaintiff 
law, unavailable in the United States due to the First Amendment, will 
                                                          
1. Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–05). 
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apply.2 Even assuming libel tourism to be sufficiently troublesome to merit 
a governmental response, the SPEECH Act is deeply flawed for three 
reasons. The Act parochially disregards the legitimate interests of other 
countries that constitutionally protect speech differently than the United 
States. The Act also is constitutionally parochial in relation to due process 
limits on personal jurisdiction, withholding recognition and enforcement 
unless the foreign court’s assertion of jurisdiction complies with American 
due process requirements. Finally, the Act’s systematic parochialism has 
the potential to cause harms that are greater than might be anticipated, 
because the Act’s broad language makes it applicable to far more than just 
libel tourism. 
Part I explains the SPEECH Act’s operation, demonstrating its 
unexpected breadth as well as its systematic and categorical parochialism. 
Part II explains why the Act’s constitutional parochialism is normatively 
problematic. Part III tries to explain why Congress took the parochial 
path, and it then considers more promising approaches that might be 
taken in the future to address libel tourism.  
I. THE SPEECH ACT’S OPERATION: SURPRISING BREADTH AND 
CATEGORICAL PAROCHIALISM  
The SPEECH Act does three main things. First, it categorically 
prohibits the recognition or enforcement, in both federal and state courts, 
of all “defamation” judgments from foreign countries that could not have 
been successfully asserted under American defamation law.3 Second, the 
Act creates a cause of action that allows for a declaratory judgment that 
any foreign claim that could not have been successfully asserted under 
American law is “repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United 
States.”4 Third, the Act authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorney’s 
fees for a defendant who successfully invokes its provisions against a 
plaintiff who sought to enforce a foreign country’s defamation judgment 
in a federal or state court.5 
Virtually no reported case law has yet interpreted the recently enacted 
SPEECH Act. A careful reading of the statute, however, reveals that it is 
surprisingly broad and systematically parochial. 
                                                          
2. Id. § 4101. 
3. Id. § 4102(a). 
4. Id. § 4104. 
5. Id. § 4105. 
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A. The Act’s Surprising Breadth 
The Act is unexpectedly broad in two critical respects: (1) as to who 
may invoke it; and (2) against what types of judgments it may be invoked. 
1. To Whom the SPEECH Act is Available 
Who is eligible to invoke the Act’s absolute defense against recognition 
and enforcement? One might naturally expect that the Act is available only 
to United States citizens and corporations. After all, the Act’s findings 
recite that “[s]ome persons are obstructing the free expression rights of 
United States authors and publishers” through libel tourism.6 The findings also 
speak of foreign lawsuits “against United States persons within their courts,”7 
and the Act provides a full definition of “United States person.”8 
A careful reading of the statute, however, leads to the conclusion that 
anyone against whom domestic enforcement of a foreign country’s 
judgment is sought may rely on the Act’s absolute defense against 
recognition and enforcement. The Act mandates that “a domestic 
court” — which the Act defines as including both federal and state 
courts9 — “shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation,” with 
only two (soon to be analyzed) caveats, neither of which confines the Act’s 
invocation to United States persons.10 Indeed, the caveats’ only mention of 
the defendant refers to “the party opposing recognition or enforcement of 
that foreign judgment”11 — not to “the United States person” opposing 
recognition or enforcement.12 
Accordingly, under the Act’s plain language, foreign corporations, 
foreign citizens, and other foreign entities would appear to be eligible to 
                                                          
6. Id. § 4101 Note § 2(2) (emphasis added). 
7. Id. § 4101 Note § 2(5) (emphasis added). 
8. 28 U.S.C. § 4101(6) (defining “United States person” as a citizen, a legal alien, or “a business 
entity incorporated in, or with its primary location or place of operation in, the United States”); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 2–3 (2009), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 812, 813–814 (speaking, 
consistent with the Act’s findings, of the problem of “defamation suits against American authors and 
publishers,” and describing several lawsuits against “American defendants”); S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 
4 (2010) (explaining that “[f]ederal legislation is necessary to ensure that American authors, reporters, and 
publishers have nationwide protection from foreign libel judgments”) (emphasis added); H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-154, at 4 (2010), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 812, 815 (“American authors and publishers 
should be able to write and publish for an American audience . . . .”). 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 4101(2). 
10. Id. § 4102(a)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added). 
11. Id. § 4102(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
12. Apart from the Act’s definitions provision, “United States person” is mentioned only once: in 
the declaratory judgment provision. Id. § 4104(a)(1) (“Any United States person . . . may bring an 
action in district court . . . for a declaration that the foreign judgment is repugnant to the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.”). 
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invoke its absolute defense against recognition and enforcement in a state 
or federal court.13 
2. To What the SPEECH Act Applies 
The Act applies to an unexpectedly broad range of foreign judgments. 
At first glance, the Act’s absolute defense appears to have only narrow 
application since the Act applies only to “a foreign judgment for 
defamation”14 and specifically provides that it should not be “construed 
to . . . affect the enforceability of any foreign judgment other than a foreign 
judgment for defamation.”15 But the Act is more broadly applicable than might 
be expected in two respects. First, despite the fact that the SPEECH Act’s 
legislative history and preamble clearly indicate that the Act was intended 
to address only a subset of foreign defamation judgments — libel 
tourism16 — the Act’s defense appears to be applicable to all foreign 
defamation judgments. It mandates nonrecognition and nonenforcement 
of any foreign country defamation judgment that could not have been 
successfully pressed in the United States under federal or state law,17 and 
allows a United States person to sue for a declaration that any such foreign 
judgment is “repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States.”18 
The Act makes no effort to distinguish between libel tourism — the suing 
in a foreign jurisdiction to wrongfully gain access to that country’s pro-
plaintiff law — and a defamation claim that does not constitute libel 
tourism (for instance, a claim litigated in a foreign country, under that 
                                                          
13. Only a “United States person,” however, may obtain a declaratory judgment that a foreign 
judgment is repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. 
14. Id. § 4102(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Act applies to foreign defamation claims that meet 
certain (soon to be discussed) criteria. 
15. Id. § 4102(e) (emphasis added). 
16. H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 2–4 (2009); S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 2–5 (2009). 
17. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a) (“[A] domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for 
defamation unless the domestic court determines that (A) the defamation law applied in the foreign 
court’s adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that 
case as would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by 
the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is located; or (B) even if the 
defamation law applied in the foreign court’s adjudication did not provide as much protection for 
freedom of speech and press as the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the 
constitution and law of the State, the party opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign 
judgment would have been found liable for defamation by a domestic court applying the first 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State in 
which the domestic court is located.”). 
18. Id. § 4104(a)(1). A foreign judgment is “repugnant” if “it would not be enforceable” under the 
SPEECH Act. Id. The Act allows a “United States person” to obtain a declaratory judgment of 
repugnance vis-à-vis “a foreign judgment [that] is entered on the basis of the content of any writing, 
utterance, or other speech by that person that has been published,” without providing any 
geographical limitations as to the location of publication or speech. In other words, the Act 
empowers a domestic court to issue a repugnance declaration to a French judgment based on a 
French hate speech law that was applied to a French Nazi who violated the French act in France. For 
more on this, see infra Part II. 
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country’s defamation law, because everything relevant to the defamation 
occurred there). Let us provisionally call this second type of defamation 
lawsuit an instance of “legitimate libel pluralism” (LLP). Part II of this 
article justifies the proposition that there indeed exists a category of LLP. 
For now, all that is necessary is to recognize that the Act does not 
distinguish between libel tourism and LLP. 
Second, the Act adopts an expansive definition of defamation. 
Defamation includes not only “any action for other proceeding for 
defamation, libel, [or] slander,” but also any “similar claim alleging that forms of 
speech are false, have caused damage to reputation or emotional distress . . . or have 
resulted in criticism, dishonor, or condemnation of any person.”19 Under this 
definition, the SPEECH Act could be applied to matters not typically 
considered defamation in the United States. For example, the Act plausibly 
could apply to a damages judgment predicated on (what we in the United 
States would call)20 a foreign country’s hate speech laws.21 After all, hate 
speech prohibitions apply to speech that is false, that causes damage to 
“reputation” or “emotional distress,” or that “result[s] in criticism, 
dishonor, or condemnation” of persons in the protected group.22 
Accordingly, a foreign judgment based on what we in the United States 
would call a hate speech violation may be “similar” to a libel, slander, or 
defamation claim and thereby fall under the SPEECH Act’s absolute 
immunization against recognition and enforcement. Application of the Act 
to hate speech judgments from other countries might harm U.S. foreign 
relations. This is because hate speech regulations have high political 
salience in many countries — hate speech regulations may be seen as 
important to maintaining domestic stability, or as a core expression of a 
country’s foundational political commitments. 
B. The Act’s Systematic and Categorical Parochialism  
The SPEECH Act is systematically parochial in the sense that it treats all 
U.S. constitutional requirements within its purview — both substantive 
                                                          
19. Id. § 4101(1) (emphasis added). 
20. Jeremy Waldron notes that what we in the United States typically call “hate speech” is labeled 
as “group libel” or “group defamation” in other countries. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and 
Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1601 (2010). One of Waldron’s main points 
is that hate speech laws are best understood as “protecting vulnerable minorities against the evil of 
group defamation.” Id. at 1600. I largely agree with Waldron, but the very fact that he wrote this article 
demonstrates the point made above in text that hate speech is not typically understood in the United 
States as a form of defamation law. For that reason, the Act’s definition of defamation is surprisingly 
broad. At the same time, the Act’s (even unintended) breadth pushes in the direction Waldron 
advocates, i.e., it assimilates hate speech into defamation. 
21. Though European hate speech laws generally are criminal, many also allow civil lawsuits for 
damages. This is true, for example, under both German and French law. See Winfried Brugger, The 
Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (Part I), 4 GERMAN L.J. 1, 20 (2003). 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 4101(1). 
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and procedural — as the standard against which other countries are to be 
judged. The Act is categorically parochial in the sense that defamation 
judgments from countries with different standards cannot — without 
exception — be recognized or enforced unless the claim could have been 
successfully brought in a domestic court. 
Regarding substantive constitutional standards, the Act disregards the 
possibility that other liberal democracies constitutionally protect speech in 
defensibly different ways than does the United States. All that matters 
under the SPEECH Act is whether the defamation law of the country 
from which the judgment has issued (the “Issuing Country”) grants “at 
least as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as 
would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States . . .”23 If the foreign country’s defamation law does not, then 
the foreign judgment categorically “shall not” be enforced unless “the 
party opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign judgment would 
have been found liable for defamation by a domestic court applying the first amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State in 
which the domestic court is located.”24 Though there is some ambiguity in this 
language,25 it almost certainly was intended by Congress to mean that the 
foreign judgment can be enforced only if the plaintiff would have been 
able to assert a successful claim for defamation under the substantive 
defamation law of the state in which the domestic court is located, had all 
relevant acts occurred within that state.26 
                                                          
23. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A). In fact, the Act’s parochialism is even more extreme. If the “State in 
which the domestic court is located” has stricter constitutional or statutory protections of freedom of 
speech and press than the First Amendment, then that state’s law becomes the baseline against which 
the foreign country is judged. Id. § 4102(a)(1)(A). In other words, if the foreign country protects 
speech “as much” as the First Amendment, but less than the state in which the domestic court sits, 
then the foreign country’s judgment cannot be enforced. Id. 
24. Id. § 4102(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
25. The ambiguity is this: If the “law of the State in which the domestic court is located” is 
understood as including the state’s choice of law rules, then the foreign country’s law frequently may 
be the chosen substantive law. The domestic court could constitutionally apply the foreign law, even 
if an American polity would not have been constitutionally able to have enacted it, for reasons 
explained later. See infra Part II.B. Consequently, on this interpretation of the statutory language, the 
SPEECH Act’s “unless” clause would be satisfied, thereby permitting a domestic court to enforce 
many foreign defamation judgments. Though a possible reading, the legislative history discussed 
above leaves no doubt that this was not what Congress intended. Instead, the “law of the State in 
which the domestic court is located” undoubtedly was not intended to encompass the state’s choice 
of law rules, but only its substantive defamation law, leading to the interpretation of the Act provided 
above in text. 
26. One other point of ambiguity bears mention at this point: if the above condition is met, is 
enforcement of the foreign judgment mandatory or permissible? The Act says only that foreign 
defamation judgments “shall not” be enforced “unless” conditions (A) or (B) are met. 28 U.S.C. § 
4102(a)(1). Accordingly, it is not entirely clear as to whether a foreign judgment meeting either 
criterion (A) or (B) can be, or shall be, enforced. The slightly more natural interpretation may be “shall 
be” on the ground that such a construction more perfectly contrasts with the “shall not . . . unless” 
formulation. There are policy reasons, however, for favoring the permissive interpretation. 
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As to procedural constitutional standards, the SPEECH Act provides 
that domestic courts “shall not recognize or enforce” foreign defamation 
judgments “unless the domestic court determines that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by the foreign court comported with the due process 
requirements that are imposed on domestic courts by the Constitution of the United 
States.”27 This is a second example of constitutional parochialism: the Act 
does not credit the possibility that other countries might instantiate 
constitutional limits on adjudicatory jurisdiction in defensibly different 
ways than the United States. 
II. WHY THE SPEECH ACT’S PAROCHIALISM IS NORMATIVELY 
UNDESIRABLE 
A five-step argument establishes that the SPEECH Act’s systematic 
parochialism is undesirable and that there can exist a category of legitimate 
libel pluralism: (1) it is normatively legitimate for other countries — 
including other liberal democracies — to understand and give effect to 
constitutional protections (such as the commitments to free speech and 
due process) differently than we do in the United States; (2) it would not 
be unconstitutional for a domestic court to enforce a foreign judgment 
based on substantive legal standards that could not have been enacted by 
the jurisdiction in which the court sits on account of the First Amendment 
(what I shall call an “Un-American Judgment”); (3) deciding whether to 
enforce Un-American Judgments is a matter of policy; (4) there are strong 
policy reasons for enforcing Un-American Judgments in some 
circumstances; and (5) the Act’s supporters did not provide any 
justifications for categorically denying recognition and enforcement to Un-
American judgments, nor are there any convincing reasons to do so. 
A. Legitimate Constitutional Pluralism 
As is well known, the United States provides more constitutional 
protection for speech than do other liberal democracies. For example, 
many other countries, including Germany and France, ban what we in the 
United States call hate speech,28 whereas such regulations of speech are 
unconstitutional in the United States.29 Also, most other countries strike a 
different balance between dignitary interests and speech than does the 
                                                          
27. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
28. See Waldron, supra note 20, at 1597–98 (noting that England, Canada, France, Denmark, 
Germany, New Zealand, and some of the states of Australia have laws “prohibiting statements ‘by 
which a group of people are threatened, insulted or degraded on account of their race, colour, 
national or ethnic origin,” what Waldron correctly notes is typically called “hate speech legislation” in 
the United States). 
29. See, e.g., RAV v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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United States, more readily allowing lawsuits for defamation than the First 
Amendment has been interpreted to permit.30 
Normatively, what is one to make of this diversity of approaches to the 
constitutional protection of speech? Is the variety of approaches 
something to bemoan while hoping that other countries will adopt our 
ways?31 Call this the “constitutional uniformity” view. Or is such diversity 
something to tolerate or even applaud? Let us call this the “constitutional 
pluralism” view. 
There are four reasons to think that constitutional pluralism is a 
sounder view than constitutional uniformity. First, countries differ with 
regard to their histories and their social and political circumstances. For 
example, notwithstanding the American commitment to free political 
association, after World War II the United States approved a constitution 
for Germany32 that subjected the freedom of association to a content 
based restriction that “explicitly forb[ade] the formation of antidemocratic 
and other antithetical groups.”33 This is not an example of American 
hypocrisy. Rather, because Germany had been controlled by the viciously 
deadly Nazi party, political activities by Nazis in that country would have 
carried different meaning and risks than in the United States. Securing 
political stability and reforming Germany’s politics may have justifiably 
required restrictions that would not have been necessary, or justifiable, in 
the United States. Similar considerations may well justify the anti-Nazi 
laws still found in France,34 which was governed by the pro-Nazi Vichy 
government during the Second World War.35 
This first reason — that different countries have different histories and 
circumstances — on its own may provide only a modest justification for 
constitutional pluralism. This is because the first reason is consistent with, 
though not necessarily driven by, a view of constitutionalism quite close to 
constitutional uniformity: that all countries should share the same meaning 
                                                          
30. See generally James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279 
(2000); THE PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST INVASIONS BY MASS MEDIA 
(Helmut Koziol & Alexander Warzilek eds., 2005). 
31. This view pervades the Act’s legislative history. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 9 (2010) 
(“Regrettably, many other countries place lesser value on free expression and do not provide the 
strong legal protection for speech and the press that exists in the United States.”). But see 155 CONG. 
REC. H6772 (daily ed. June 15, 2009) (statement of Rep. King) (“We cannot change other countries’ 
[libel] laws, nor would we want to. We must respect their laws, as they ought to respect ours.”). 
32. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 10 
(1994). 
33. Donna E. Arzt, Nuremberg, Denazification and Democracy: The Hate Speech Problem at the 
International Military Tribunal, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 689, 733 (1995) (reviewing TELFORD 
TALYOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)). 
34. See, e.g., CODE PÉNAL art. R645-2 (Fr.). 
35. See generally RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (NYU 
Press 1998). 
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of free speech,36 but that identical meaning necessarily will have different 
applications across countries.37 Let us call this view the “soft constitutional 
pluralism” view. 
Three additional reasons not only counsel in favor of constitutional 
pluralism over constitutional uniformity, but justify a more extensive form 
of diversity than “soft constitutional pluralism” which might be called 
“hard constitutional pluralism.” Let me first explain what hard 
constitutional pluralism is before providing justifications for it. John Rawls 
states that there are multiple “liberalisms” because “[p]olitical conceptions 
differ” across liberal societies “in how they order, or balance, political 
principles and values even when they specify the same principles and 
values as significant.”38 For instance, liberal polities differ as to how they 
“order” or “balance” the value of speech as against political stability, or of 
speech as against dignity. Rawls states that these different balancings 
reflect countries’ differing “political conceptions.”39 Such cross country 
differences are not merely different applications of shared meaning. For 
instance, disagreements as to how commitments to speech are to be 
harmonized with the competing commitments of political stability or 
dignity constitute genuine substantive differences concerning the scope of 
speech’s constitutional protection, not just different “applications” of 
identical meaning. Further, under Rawls’ reasoning, there is no hope or 
expectation of convergence over time. Rather, a multiplicity of 
liberalisms — and a corresponding diversity of balancings — is what is to 
be expected under free conditions. 
Having defined hard constitutional pluralism, I shall now provide three 
justifications for it vis-à-vis both soft constitutional pluralism and 
constitutional uniformity. 
First, we presently live in a world of hard constitutional pluralism, not 
soft constitutional pluralism.40 Peace and stability is best achieved by 
                                                          
36. Speech is only one example, of course. The argument above in text can apply to any or all 
constitutional commitments. 
37. This is the international analogue of the argument made by some as to why originalists are 
bound by the original “meaning” of the Constitution but not by the Framers’ expected applications. 
See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L. J. 569 (1998). 
For a succinct explanation of their subtle argument, see Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional 
Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 372, 401–02 (2012). I myself question the 
extent to which “meanings” are distinct from “applications,” but this is not the place to explain why. 
Even if the distinction is not analytically defensible, it still performs real political work insofar as it 
allows people to simultaneously claim allegiance to originalism and reject certain of the Framers’ 
views and expectations as to what was required by the Constitution they had drafted. 
38. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 14 (1999); see also id. at 141 (“Political conceptions 
differ also in how they order, or balance, political principles and values even when they specify the 
same ones.”). 
39. Id. at 14. 
40. To be clear, on this account some differences across countries may well be characterized as 
soft pluralism — but not all are. 
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generally respecting these sorts of constitutional differences41 across 
countries — something that myriad legal doctrines (such as comity and the 
margin of appreciation) already do. 
The second justification for hard constitutional pluralism rests on 
foundational liberal principles.42 Rawls concludes that there are multiple 
“liberalisms” — each of which balances competing values differently — 
because reasonable people can come to different conclusions as to which 
“political conception” they think is best. “Citizens will differ as to which 
of these conceptions they think the most reasonable, but they should be 
able to agree that all are reasonable, even if barely so.”43 The respect that is 
owed to reasonable people in other countries requires that we respect the 
political conceptions that they use to govern themselves, even if we choose 
another political conception to operate in our country.44 In Rawls’ words: 
Even when two or more people have liberal constitutional regimes, 
their conceptions of constitutionalism may diverge and express 
different variations of liberalism. A (reasonable) Law of Peoples 
must be acceptable to reasonable people who are thus diverse; and 
it must be fair between them and effective in shaping the larger 
schemes of their cooperation.45 
The third and fourth justifications for hard constitutional pluralism are 
international analogues of two common arguments for federalism: 
experimentation and diversity. Though frequently considered together, 
experimentation and diversity are conceptually distinct. Paralleling Justice 
Brandeis’ New State Ice Company dissent,46 the third rationale is that hard 
constitutional pluralism permits laboratories for experimentation among 
different constitutional democracies as to the best way of “ordering” or 
“balancing” constitutional values against competing (constitutional and 
                                                          
41. I say “these sorts of constitutional differences” because Rawls is speaking about differences 
across liberal polities. Respecting the different ways that different liberal polities balance competing 
values does not necessarily entail respecting the ways that nonliberal polities strike such a balance. 
Rawls creates an illuminating typology of governmental forms, concluding that liberal polities should 
tolerate certain nonliberal polities (“decent hierarchical peoples”) but not others. See RAWLS, supra 
note 38, at 59–88. Without necessarily defending the specifics of Rawls’ scheme, the important point 
for present purposes is that respecting different liberal countries’ constitutional balancings does not 
mean that all other countries’ judgments would have to be recognized and enforced. For more on the 
appropriate limits on what types of foreign judgments should not be recognized or enforced, see infra 
pp. 118–19. 
42. So does the fourth. See infra p. 112. 
43. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 14. 
44. Indeed, Rawls goes so far as to conclude that liberal polities have a duty to tolerate certain 
nonliberal polities. Id. at 59–88. Liberal polities a fortiori have a duty to tolerate the different political 
conceptions that may be chosen by other liberal polities. 
45. Id. at 11–12. 
46. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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nonconstitutional)47 values. To be sure, how one assesses the strength of 
the experimentation justification likely turns on one’s answer to the 
contested question of whether foreign constitutional law can illuminate 
American constitutional law.48 In my view, there are at least two sorts of 
relevant inputs that experimentation may provide. First, some 
constitutional questions turn on empirical predictions as to how 
governmental institutions or personnel are likely to behave when subject 
to rules and other incentives. Second, many constitutional questions boil 
down to a determination of how constitutional values are to be balanced 
against competing values.49 In my view, other countries’ experiences may 
provide normative guidance in these two domains, though they ought not 
to be dispositive.50 
Whereas the “experimentation” justification generally (though not 
necessarily) implies an expectation of convergence over time as the “best” 
solution is found, the fourth justification — “diversity” — presumes that 
differences are likely to endure, and views this as a normative good. An 
intuitive argument for diversity proceeds from the assumption that the 
differences that give rise to distinct liberalisms reflect different underlying 
psychological or cultural values that are not subject to logical proof and 
disproof. If this is so, then a diversity of polities permits individuals or 
cultural groups with differing values to move to or otherwise associate 
with the polity that reflects their values. The diversity justification can also 
be more formally derived under standard Rawlsian premises. Rawls uses 
the “second original position” to derive the “law of peoples” that should 
govern the different peoples of the world. As in the domestic version of 
the “original position,” participants in the second original position are 
behind a veil of ignorance, meaning that they do not know the identity of 
the people they represent.51 Participants accordingly would choose a law of 
peoples that allowed for a diversity of liberal polities to maximize the 
chance that each participant’s preferences would be able to be satisfied.52 
                                                          
47. I say competing “constitutional and nonconstitutional” values because it is commonplace in 
contemporary constitutional democracies that sufficiently powerful nonconstitutional considerations 
can justify the regulation of constitutional values. For instructive discussions of this phenomenon, 
see Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 789 (2007); Frederick Schauer, 
A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429, 431 (1993). 
48. For a useful summary of some of this vast literature, see Rosalind Dixon & Eric A. Posner, 
The Limits of Constitutional Convergence, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 399 (2011). 
49. As noted above, the competing value may be either of constitutional dimension, or 
significant, but less than constitutional significance. See supra note 47.  
50. Other countries’ experiences should not be determinative because, as to the first type of 
input, social and cultural differences might lead an incentive structure to operate differently across 
countries and, as to the second input, how a country harmonizes competing commitments is an 
important determinant of that country’s unique political culture. See RAWLS, supra note 38. 
51. See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 30–35. 
52. See id. at 41. 
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To quickly conclude, I have sketched three positions regarding 
constitutional differences across polities: (1) constitutional uniformity; (2) 
soft constitutional pluralism; and (3) hard constitutional pluralism. I have 
provided four arguments against constitutional uniformity, three of which 
constitute arguments for preferring hard constitutional pluralism to soft 
constitutional pluralism. 
Two clarifications are in order. First, the arguments above are not 
limited to free speech, but prima facie extend to all constitutional principles. 
The arguments for pluralism accordingly extend to the constitutional 
principles used by different countries to determine due process’ limits to 
adjudicatory jurisdiction — the other constitutional principle with respect 
to which the SPEECH Act takes a parochial position.  
Second, the four arguments for constitutional pluralism do not lead to 
the conclusion that all countries’ constitutional doctrines should be 
respected. Rawls, for example, provides a framework under which respect 
is accorded to all liberal countries (and even some nonliberal countries), 
but not to all countries.53 In other words, the analysis above explains the 
error of parochially using U.S. constitutional law as the criterion against 
which all other countries’ constitutional orders is judged, but does not 
indicate constitutional pluralism’s appropriate outer limits. More 
concretely, the analysis to this point has explained why the Act’s 
categorical parochialism is a mistake, but has not provided a basis for 
specifying what limits the Act should have adopted. (I provide a 
preliminary answer to that question in subsection D of this Part). 
B. Unconstitutional Judgments versus Un-American Judgments 
Even if one agrees that there are strong normative arguments for 
constitutional pluralism, the SPEECH Act’s parochialism could be 
defended on positive grounds, if it were unconstitutional for domestic 
courts to enforce foreign judgments predicated on foreign law that could 
not have been enacted in this country on account of the First Amendment. 
Prior to the Act’s passage, most domestic courts that were asked to 
enforce such foreign defamation judgments concluded that the 
Constitution precluded them from doing so,54 and some of the Act’s 
supporters repeated this claim.55 
                                                          
53. More specifically, Rawls concludes that the Law of Peoples that is generated by liberal 
peoples should tolerate “decent hierarchical peoples,” but not “outlaw states,” “societies burdened by 
unfavorable conditions,” or “benevolent absolutisms.” Id. at 63. 
54. See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 180–86 (2004). 
55. See, e.g., Are Foreign Libel Lawsuits Chilling Americans’ First Amendment Rights?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2010) [hereinafter Foreign Libel Lawsuits](testimony of Bruce D. 
Brown, Partner, Baker Hostetler) (advocating the creation of a “uniform national policy that would 
say recognition of these judgments violates the First Amendment”); see also id. at 17 (criticizing the 
then status quo as one in which “you are dealing with State public policy, not the constitutional 
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An earlier article of mine debunked this view.56 It argued that while 
such a foreign judgment may be “Un-American” insofar as it comes from 
a non-American polity and reflects political values at variance with 
American constitutional law, neither the foreign judgment itself, nor its 
recognition or enforcement by an American court, could be 
unconstitutional.57 Though I cannot distill an entire article’s argument into 
four short paragraphs, I nonetheless will try to briefly explain why foreign 
defamation judgments may be “Un-American,” but cannot be 
unconstitutional. 
Let the analysis start by identifying a fact of judicial practice in the 
United States. Courts enforce antidisclosure clauses in settlement 
agreements, even though a statute prohibiting disclosure of the same 
information would violate the First Amendment.58 Similarly, while the 
Establishment Clause bars states from enacting intestacy laws that would 
disinherit children who married out of a particular religious faith, state 
courts regularly enforce wills that contain such anti-intermarriage 
provisions.59 
These examples show that domestic courts enforce privately created 
restrictions that state and federal legislatures could not constitutionally 
make.60 This is because the U.S. Constitution limits governments, not 
individuals.61 Though courts unquestionably are state actors, the substance 
of the restrictions they judicially enforce is not attributed to the state for 
purposes of the state action doctrine if state law is not the source of the 
restriction. There are only two cases to the contrary — Shelley v. Kraemer62 
and Barrows v. Jackson63 — the famous decisions in which the Supreme 
Court held that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants — 
privately created restrictions — violate the Constitution.64 As shown by 
the antidisclosure and anti-intermarriage examples above, the Court has 
not extended Shelley’s (and Barrows’) holdings: Shelley did not allow state 
                                                                                                                                      
overlay that the First Amendment would provide”). 
56. See Rosen, supra note 54, at 186–209. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. at 193 (discussing State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858, 870–71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), review denied 
by Calof v. Casebeer, 22 P.3d 802 (Wash. 2001)); see also Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer 
Incorrectly Decided? — Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 459 (2007) (discussing United Egg 
Producers v. Standard Brands, Inc., 44 F.3d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
59. See Rosen, supra note 58, at 460 n.41. 
60. For more examples, see id. at 458–61. 
61. There are one or two exceptions here. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 30 (1883) 
(addressing the Thirteenth Amendment); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (addressing the right to 
travel). 
62. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
63. 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
64. Shelley concerned an injunction to enforce the covenant against a nonparty to the covenant, 
and Barrows extended Shelley’s holding to a suit for damages against one of the signatories of the 
covenant. See Rosen, supra note 58, at 462. 
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courts to enforce racially restrictive covenants because state legislatures 
could not have enacted racial zoning law, yet post-Shelley courts enforce 
privately created antidisclosure restriction despite the fact that the First 
Amendment precludes legislatures from enacting such a restriction. More 
generally, as I have shown elsewhere, the Supreme Court in practice has 
limited Shelley to its facts,65 because doing otherwise would have effectively 
applied constitutional limitations to contracts that were made by 
individuals.66 
We are now in a position to understand why it is not unconstitutional 
for a domestic court to enforce a foreign defamation judgment, even if the 
law on which the judgment is based could not have been enacted in the 
United States due to the First Amendment. Just as American constitutional 
limitations do not apply to American citizens, the U.S. Constitution also 
does not apply to foreign countries.67 So long as an American government 
was not the progenitor of the restriction, an American court can 
constitutionally enforce that restriction. In other words, for purposes of 
the state action doctrine’s application to courts, foreign governments stand 
on the same footing as American citizens, insofar as the U.S. Constitution 
limits neither.68 
As a result, the U.S. Constitution does not prevent a domestic court 
from applying a foreign country’s law in the course of litigation, even if 
that law could not constitutionally have been enacted by a state. From this, 
it follows that a domestic court may recognize or enforce a foreign 
country’s judgment without triggering the U.S. Constitution, even if the 
U.S. Constitution would prevent a state from enacting the law underlying 
the foreign judgment.69 In short, the foreign law and judgment may well be 
Un-American, but neither the law nor the judgment’s domestic 
enforcement can be unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution. 
C. A Matter of Policy  
If constitutional pluralism is normatively superior to constitutional 
uniformity (Part II.A) and the Constitution does not preclude domestic 
                                                          
65. Id. at 458–70. 
66. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d ed. 1988) (noting 
that Shelley’s approach, “consistently applied, would require individuals to conform their private 
agreements to constitutional standards whenever individuals might later seek the security of judicial 
enforcement, as if often the case”). 
67. See Rosen, supra note 54, at 206–09. 
68. See id. 
69. With one caveat: judicial enforcement of a foreign judgment would violate due process if the 
foreign court had not had a legitimate basis for asserting either adjudicatory or regulatory jurisdiction. 
An interesting question, which I shall not pursue here, is whether this determination regarding 
adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction should be made on the basis of U.S. constitutional or other 
standards. 
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courts from enforcing Un-American Judgments (Part II.B), does it follow 
that domestic courts must enforce Un-American foreign judgments? The 
answer, normatively and doctrinally, is “no.” Whether Un-American 
Judgments should be enforced is a matter of policy. 
There are many important implications. The Constitution neither 
requires, nor forbids, the enforcement of an Un-American Judgment. In 
the absence of law or treaty, courts must decide whether, as a matter of 
policy, Un-American Judgments should be enforced. As a doctrinal matter 
this determination is properly made under the “public policy” exception.70 
However, the federal government has the power to displace the public 
policy exception and to determine for itself whether Un-American foreign 
judgments should be enforced. Un-American Judgments unquestionably 
could be the subject of a treaty, or alternatively could be addressed by 
ordinary legislation under Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce. 
It also is possible that the President alone could enter into executive 
agreements with foreign countries.71 It is worth reiterating that when 
negotiating with other countries, the political branches have wide flexibility 
insofar as the Constitution does not prevent them from requiring domestic 
courts to recognize or enforce Un-American Judgments. 
D. Policy Reasons for Enforcing Un-American Judgments 
The fourth part of the argument against the SPEECH Act’s categorical 
parochialism is that there are powerful policy reasons for sometimes 
enforcing Un-American Judgments. Elsewhere I have explored at length 
the considerations that appropriately inform the enforceability of Un-
American Judgments.72 It might be useful to provide an overview of some 
of that article’s most salient conclusions, without purporting to reproduce 
its full analysis here. 
My earlier article showed that there is a range of plausible normative 
approaches that can be taken to the enforcement of Un-American 
Judgments. It did so by considering enforcement from the perspectives of 
two polar opposite approaches to foreign affairs.73 First, a Rawlsian 
approach identifies rules that participants in a “second original position” 
would think to be fair. This generates what conflicts-of-law scholars call a 
“multilateralist” approach that takes account of the interests of both the 
                                                          
70. The seminal case concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments is Hilton v. Guyot, 159 
U.S. 113 (1895). For a discussion of the public policy exception, see Rosen, supra note 54, at 176–79. 
71. The President conceivably could rely on his power to receive ambassadors, his general foreign 
affairs powers, or longstanding historical practice. For a skeptical view, see Bradford C. Clark, 
Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007). I shall not say more about this 
interesting question here. 
72. See Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783 
(2004). 
73. See id. at 799–859. 
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forum country (where enforcement is sought) and the foreign country 
(from where the judgment issued).74 Second, a game theoretic approach 
analyzes enforcement “unilaterally,” i.e., exclusively from the perspective 
of maximizing the forum state’s interests.75 
Many important implications follow. First, deciding between the 
Rawlsian and game theoretic approaches, or where along the continuum 
between them to be, is a quintessential policy choice. For basic democratic 
reasons, such a choice is best made by the more political branches of 
government.76 
Second, both the Rawlsian and game theoretic approaches concur that 
some Un-American Judgments should be enforced77 — an outcome not 
permitted under the SPEECH Act.78 For example, enforcement is 
desirable under both game theoretic and Rawlsian approaches if 
enforcement is deemed to be important to support a foreign country’s 
political stability.79 
Third, a Rawlsian approach favors enforcement more frequently than 
does a game theoretic approach. Consider a case in which A, a public 
figure, obtains a judgment against B under U.K. law for defamatory 
statements made by B in the United Kingdom, while both lived in the 
United Kingdom.80 Assume as well that B’s statements would not have 
been actionable in the United States, on account of the tougher 
defamation standards demanded by the First Amendment. If B refuses to 
pay the judgment and moves himself and his assets to the United States, A 
will have to enforce the judgment in the United States. Though a game 
theoretic approach would likely lead to the conclusion that the British 
judgment should not be enforced,81 a Rawlsian approach would allow 
enforcement.82 
                                                          
74. See id. at 811–23, 856–57. 
75. See id. at 802–11, 842–46. 
76. See id. at 800–02. 
77. See id. at 845–46 (discussing when game theory would conclude that an Un-American 
Judgment should be enforced); see also id. at 846–49 (discussing when Rawlsian theory would 
conclude that an Un-American Judgment should be enforced). 
78. Nor is enforcement allowed under the erroneous notion addressed above that the 
Constitution flatly prohibits a domestic court’s enforcement of an Un-American Judgment. 
79. See Rosen, supra note 72, at 845–49. 
80. This is a slight variant of the facts in Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997), which I 
analyzed fully in Rosen, supra note 72, at 859–863. 
81. A game theoretic approach asks only whether enforcement is desirable from the perspective 
of the United States, taking account of the costs and benefits of enforcing and not enforcing the 
judgment. Enforcing A’s judgment would deplete assets of a United States citizen and transfer wealth 
outside the United States. As to the costs of nonenforcement, there would appear to be little 
likelihood that nonenforcement would harm the U.S.-U.K. relationship. 
82. For a full explanation as to why, see Rosen, supra note 72, at 859–863. For a similar argument, 
see Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 59–71 (2009) (statement of Linda J. Silberman, Professor, New York University 
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Fourth, a Rawlsian approach nonetheless does not lead to the 
conclusion that all Un-American Judgments should be enforced. To the 
contrary, it provides two criteria for determining those Un-American 
Judgments that should not be enforced. Some Un-American Judgments 
would not be enforced on account of the content of the foreign country’s 
substantive law. This category of flatly unenforceable judgments, however, 
would be a small subset of Un-American Judgments, and would not 
include foreign judgments based on other liberal democracy’s laws.83 As to 
all other Un-American Judgments, enforcement would be determined on 
the basis of what I have dubbed an “international comparative 
impairment” analysis. This analysis takes account of the domestic costs of 
enforcement and the costs of nonenforcement vis-à-vis the defendant, the 
international system, and the foreign country that issued the judgment.84 
International comparative impairment counsels choosing the course that 
minimizes the total costs. That is to say, it does not privilege the costs that 
fall on the enforcing state, but instead insists that all costs count equally 
regardless on whom they fall. 
Though I shall not repeat here my earlier article’s detailed discussion of 
the various costs relevant to international comparative impairment,85 two 
considerations merit mention. One important factor regarding domestic 
costs is the domestic social meaning that enforcement would carry. There 
are strong reasons to think that an American court’s enforcement of 
foreign judgments would not ordinarily be viewed by citizens as the court’s 
endorsement of these judgments.86 Another relevant consideration with 
regard to domestic enforcement costs is the fragility (or strength) of the 
American constitutional principle with which the Un-American Judgment 
is in tension. American courts can afford to be more supportive of foreign 
countries’ different approaches to the extent enforcement does not 
endanger American norms. 
                                                                                                                                      
School of Law). 
83. For Rawls’ definition of these three types of societies, see RAWLS, supra note 38, at 4–5, 90. 
See also Rosen, supra note 72, at 847 (“[T]hose judgments based on laws that reflect the problematic 
practices of outlaw states, societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, and benevolent absolutisms 
should not be enforced.”). 
84. For a full discussion, see Rosen, supra note 72, at 819–23, 847–49. 
85. See id. at 824–54. 
86. This may help explain why the quasi-Tenth Amendment anticommandeering doctrines apply 
to state executives (and legislatures), but not to state courts. See id. at 848 n.283. One of the Supreme 
Court’s justifications for its rule that state executives cannot be commandeered to enforce federal law 
is that citizens who dislike the federal law may mistakenly blame the state executives who are 
enforcing it. This justification for anticommandeering does not carry over to state courts if, as 
hypothesized above in text, courts’ application of law is not typically understood by citizens as the 
court’s endorsement of that law. See id. 
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Fifth, because international comparative analysis is institutionally 
difficult for courts to undertake,87 it may be the case that the judicial 
“public policy” analysis should be implemented by a simpler test (the 
contours of which I shall not discuss here).88 Relatedly, the types of 
analysis that international comparative impairment demand are better 
suited to the more political branches, and are best undertaken by means of 
ex ante negotiations and precommitments with other countries, typically 
through bilateral or multilateral agreements or treaties.89 
In short, sometimes — perhaps often, depending upon one’s preferred 
policy regarding foreign affairs — there may be compelling reasons for 
enforcing an Un-American Judgment. 
E. Possible Justifications for the SPEECH Act’s Categorical Parochialism 
The preceding four arguments (in Parts II.A–D) provide strong cause 
for concluding that the SPEECH Act’s categorical parochialism is 
misguided. But are there any possible justifications for the Act’s approach? 
I can think of three, though none in the end justifies the Act’s systematic 
and categorical parochialism. 
1. Reducing Decisional and Error Costs 
First, perhaps a categorical rule is preferable on account of the 
decisional and error costs that would accompany a nonabsolute rule. It is 
notable, of course, that none of the SPEECH Act’s supporters justified its 
approach on this ground. Regardless, this possibility cannot be rejected out 
of hand. The types of considerations that I have argued should determine 
whether an Un-American Judgment should be recognized or enforced are 
difficult for courts to manage.90 This is particularly true if a court utilizes a 
Rawlsian approach, which requires a comparison between the projected 
costs of enforcement to the forum and the projected costs of 
nonenforcement to the foreign country and the international system.91 
But there are many alternatives to the Act’s absolute parochialism that 
could have reduced decisional and error costs. For example, the Act could 
have provided a presumption of nonenforcement that was rebuttable only 
upon a showing that the foreign country’s law would have been selected as 
the applicable law on the basis of one, or several, specified choice of law 
test(s). If Un-American Judgments were domestically enforced only where 
there was overwhelming consensus that another country’s law was the 
                                                          
87. See id. at 819–23. 
88. For one suggestion, see id. at 854–58. 
89. See id. at 819–23. 
90. See id. at 842–54. 
91. See id. at 819–23. 
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normatively applicable law (as was true of the aforementioned hypothetical 
about U.K. public figure A’s lawsuit against U.K. citizen B)92 then the 
speech of American publishers and writers likely would not be chilled. 
After all, avoiding chilling requires predictability, not categorical immunity, 
as is shown by the fact that the First Amendment does not give the press 
categorical immunity from defamation suits.93 Alternatively, the Act could 
have included an exception requiring enforcement if the federal executive 
branch formally indicated (for instance, through a letter from the State 
Department) that enforcement would be in the national interest and that 
the foreign law was the applicable law in the case.94 
In short, decisional and error costs do not justify the Act’s categorical 
parochialism because such costs can be addressed by less draconian 
measures. 
2. Protecting Freedom of Speech 
Second, it might be thought that categorical parochialism was necessary 
to best realize the Act’s goal of freeing American publishers and writers 
from the specter of foreign defamation suits to preserve an open press. 
The argument presumably would go something like this: unless American 
publishers and writers knew with certainty that an Un-American Judgment 
would not be enforced, their speech (or at least the speech of some of 
them) may have been chilled. 
Whether or not this is true ultimately turns on prognostications as to 
how people will respond to various incentives. While such empirical 
uncertainties obviously counsel caution to a critic of the legislation, there 
are strong reasons to doubt the claim that only categorical parochialism 
could have worked. To begin, the absence of evidence in the legislative 
history that Congress considered any alternative strategies to categorical 
parochialism undermines confidence that the Act’s approach reflects a 
considered determination that this was the best way to accomplish the 
task. To the contrary, it seems that nobody in Congress considered any 
alternatives. 
This is particularly troublesome because there is reason to think that 
some middle ground could have provided writers and publishers adequate 
assurances without wholly disregarding foreign countries’ legitimate 
                                                          
92. See supra p. 117; supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
93. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280–83 (1964) (stating that a 
newspaper can be liable for publishing a defamatory falsehood concerning a public official upon 
showing that the defamatory statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or [not]”). 
94. This suggestion is parallel to the institution of so-called “Bernstein Letters” in the context of 
act of state determinations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES: THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE § 443 Reporters’ Note 8 (1987). 
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interests. The two alternatives described immediately above suggest this is 
so. 
Furthermore — and ironically — categorical parochialism may not be 
the best way to avoid chilling the speech of American writers and 
publishers. The Act does nothing to directly deter the wrongfully filed libel 
tourist lawsuits themselves. The filing and prosecution of those foreign 
lawsuits might chill American writers and publishers even if their 
judgments are unenforceable in the United States. After all, foreign 
lawsuits will be an expense and distraction if defended, may be a harassing 
distraction even if the defendant chooses not to appear, and can result in 
judgments that might be enforceable abroad if the defendant has assets in, 
or travels to, the foreign country. For these reasons, some congressmen 
wanted to fortify the Act so that it would directly discourage the filing of 
the foreign lawsuits,95 but they were unable to garner broad support for 
this, presumably because of a fear that this risked problematically 
interfering with other countries’ internal affairs.96 Such concern about 
overreaching, however, may have been due to Congress’ failure to 
differentiate between problematic libel tourism and legitimate libel 
pluralism. It certainly would have been troublesome had the Bill penalized 
all the foreign libel lawsuits to which the SPEECH Act applies. But if the 
SPEECH Act’s drafters had not taken the path of categorical parochialism 
vis-à-vis all foreign defamation lawsuits, legislators may have been willing 
to enact stronger measures that would only have targeted the smaller 
category of problematic libel tourism. Rather than interfering with other 
countries’ legitimate internal affairs, legislation targeting libel tourism 
would affect only those foreign lawsuits that problematically interfered 
with American interests, and which for that reason may plausibly be 
justified as falling within the United States’ powers to discourage.  
3. Encouraging Negotiation 
A third possible justification for the Act’s categorical parochialism is 
that its unpalatability was designed to pressure other countries to come to 
the negotiation table. This seems farfetched — none of the Act’s 
supporters justified it on this ground. Further, the Act’s efficacy in this 
regard is uncertain, and such a strategy might actually backfire by angering 
foreign countries. 
                                                          
95. See S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 10 (2010) (additional views of Senator Kyl); Foreign Libel Lawsuits, 
supra note 55, at 14–15. 
96. Senator Kyl unsuccessfully sought to add a provision to the Act “to force their accusers to 
pay for legal fees incurred abroad and, in certain cases, additional damages.” S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 
10 (2010) (additional views of Senator Kyl).  
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The bottom line is this: the Act’s categorical parochialism is difficult to 
justify. At the very least, those wishing to defend the Act’s approach have 
a heavy burden, which has not yet been met. 
III. BETTER INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS FOR ADDRESSING LIBEL 
JUDGMENTS 
The best way to think about the SPEECH Act, and what possibly might 
be done in the future, is to approach the enforcement of Un-American 
Judgments from an institutional perspective. There are five possible 
institutional contexts in which the enforceability of Un-American 
Judgments can be determined: (1) state courts; (2) federal courts; (3) state 
legislatures; (4) the Congress and President when enacting statutes; and (5) 
the President and either the Senate or both Houses of Congress when 
negotiating treaties or agreements with other countries. Prior to the Act, 
most enforcement decisions came from contexts (1) and (3): state courts 
either made case by case decisions or applied state statutes that addressed 
the enforcement of foreign judgments.97  
Institutionally, the SPEECH Act seems to be a step in the right 
direction for two reasons. First, since the enforcement of foreign 
judgments implicates foreign policy, the federal government is better 
suited than states to formulate rules regarding their enforcement. Second, 
because the enforceability of foreign judgments implicates deeply 
subjective political considerations, the rules of enforcement are better 
chosen by legislatures and the President than by courts. 
This Article has argued, however, that Congress enacted a crude 
solution without giving consideration to alternatives that could have taken 
some account of foreign countries’ legitimate interests. What went wrong? 
Two possibilities come to mind. 
A. Purely Domestic Solutions 
First, the Act’s supporters may have thought that the Constitution 
prohibited enforcement of all Un-American Judgments, and hence did not 
understand that Congress and the President had to make a policy decision 
as to whether such foreign judgments should be enforced. For the reasons 
explained above, this view is mistaken: the foreign judgments may be Un-
American, but their enforcement would not be unconstitutional. 
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Second, the purely domestic political context in which the Act was 
created was inadequate to assure normatively good results because not all 
affected interests were represented. Enforceability implicates foreign 
countries, yet these countries were not present in Congress, before 
committees, or at hearings to express their views. Congress and the 
President made a decision that imposed costs on unrepresented 
outsiders.98 
B. International Solutions 
The analysis above suggests that enforceability decisions are best made 
in a context in which all interested parties’ views are represented. A 
promising candidate to provide such context is ex ante negotiations among 
the interested countries. This would allow enforcement decisions to be 
made in a process in which the interested parties — the United States and 
the foreign countries — could communicate their interests and aim to 
negotiate solutions.99 The United States would not have to guess how 
important a particular category of foreign judgment was to another 
country, and vice versa. By putting many or all types of foreign judgments 
on the negotiation table at once, countries might be able to agree upon 
prospective enforcement rules that advance all their interests. Negotiations 
also present the opportunity for countries to create novel institutions that 
could facilitate enforcement of the rules on which they agree. 
Furthermore, negotiated solutions with other countries provide the only 
hope for addressing the source of the problem of libel tourism — the 
foreign lawsuits themselves. While the United States unilaterally can do 
little to limit the prosecution of such suits, foreign countries can — and 
might — work to limit such suits if a fair regime governing defamation 
judgments were to be negotiated. 
To be sure, arriving at an internationally negotiated solution would not 
be simple. As is well known, the Hague Conference on International 
Private Law’s attempt to draft a convention concerning the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments in the 1990s did not succeed. But it 
would be premature to conclude from this that no negotiated international 
solution is possible. To begin, many mistakes were made during that earlier 
effort, and these pitfalls could be avoided in a future attempt. Though this 
                                                          
98. For a classic discussion of this failure in the representative process, see JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 85–86 (Harvard Univ. Press, 14th 
ed. 2002) (explaining the State of Maryland’s willingness to impose a tax on the National Bank in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in these terms). 
99. For a modern discussion and critique of the preconditions of deliberative democracy, see 
DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 184–205 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
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is not the place to fully explain why the Hague Conference failed,100 a few 
examples suffice to establish the point. The Hague Conference’s rules of 
procedure were “based on the majoritarian principle, which [did] not 
encourage the reaching of consensus through compromise.”101 Pursuant to 
the Conference’s procedural rules, the Conference chose as its model the 
Brussels Convention. This turned out to be an unfortunate starting model, 
because the Brussels Convention was drafted for a small group of states 
whose jurisdictional and substantive law converged far more than the legal 
systems of the many countries that participated in the Hague 
Conference.102 Drawing from the Brussels Convention, the Hague 
Conference’s Preliminary Draft took firm positions on many issues that 
the United States could not accept.103 Professor Von Mehren, a member of 
the U.S. Delegation for the Hague Conference’s Special Commission, has 
suggested that a convention can be achieved “if its scope is more modest 
and its provisions more tolerant of differences in practices and 
values . . .”104 His point can be generalized: things can be done differently 
next time that may lead to a successful outcome. 
Without purporting to comprehensively explain what might be done 
differently in the future, I would like to make three brief points: two more 
modest approaches that might be taken in future international 
negotiations, and a proposal that careful thought be given to what types of 
professionals ought to be involved in the future negotiating and drafting of 
agreements. 
1. Subject-Matter Specific Conventions 
First, whereas the Hague Conference sought to comprehensively 
address all civil and business judgments, it might be better to seek 
agreement with regard to only one or a few areas of the law at first. After 
                                                          
100. For a discussion, see Gralf-Peter Calliess, Value-Added Norms, Local Litigation, and Global 
Enforcement: Why the Brussels-Philosophy Failed in The Hague, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1489 (2004); Arthur T. Von 
Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable 
World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COM. L. 191, 192 (2001); Linda 
Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention 
Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319 (2002); Knut Woestehoff, The Drafting Process for a Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments with Special Consideration of Intellectual Property and E-Commerce, LLM 
Theses and Essays (2005), available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/54. 
101. Von Mehren, supra note 100, at 192. 
102. See Calliess, supra note 100 at 1497–98 (“It has to be concluded that it was a serious mistake 
to draft the Hague Convention on the basis of the Brussels Convention.”); Von Mehren, supra note 
100, at 196–97 (“Clearly, the Brussels Convention was in many respects and at many levels a 
thoroughly inappropriate model for the work of the Special Commission on international jurisdiction 
and the effects of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.”). 
103. See Von Mehren, supra note 100, at 192 (quoting a letter from Assistant Legal Adviser and 
Head of the U.S. Delegation to Secretary General of the Conference that “[t]he project as currently 
embodied . . . stands no chance of being accepted in the United States”). 
104. Id. 
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all, defamation judgments raise different issues — and likely strike national 
sensibilities differently — than do judgments concerning commercial 
contract disputes or intellectual property.105 Accordingly, trying to enact a 
single convention that addresses all judgments — as the Hague 
Conference tried to do in the 1990s — might be too complex an 
undertaking. Moreover, since less would be at stake in each subject matter 
specific convention agreement insofar as no single agreement would 
address all judgments, it might be easier to reach consensus on single 
subject conventions. Further, if different approaches were taken in 
different legal contexts, each might serve as an experiment that allowed for 
the identification of best practices, or even a single best practice, over 
time. This might facilitate the adoption of additional international 
agreements so that, in time, most or all judgments would be covered. 
Regarding the choice between single subject conventions and a single 
trans-substantive convention, consider what has happened in the field of 
intellectual property. After it became clear that the Hague Convention was 
unlikely to succeed, intellectual property academics centered in Europe (at 
the Max Planck Institute) and the United States (through the American 
Law Institute (ALI)) each began separate projects that sought to develop 
principles concerning jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments involving only intellectual property rights.106 
Though each group worked independently, there was some 
communication and coordination because two members of the European 
group also served as advisers in the ALI project.107 
Both groups have now adopted a set of principles. A recent study, 
coauthored by one of the academics who served on both groups, 
concludes that “the basic policy objectives reflected in the two [projects] 
do not diverge strongly.”108 Interestingly, the study also concludes that 
“when the texts [of each group] in their (nearly) final form are compared 
with the early drafts, it can be observed that over time, a certain 
convergence has occurred between them — both texts now appear as 
more balanced than in their initial versions.”109 While it remains to be seen 
what, if anything, the international community does with the results, the 
                                                          
105. See, e.g., Annette Kur & Benedetta Ubertazzi, The ALI Principles and the CLIP Project: A 
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two groups’ experiences confirm the existence of intellectual property 
specific considerations and suggest that substantive convergence over time 
is possible. All this suggests that there may indeed be benefits to a single 
subject approach. 
2. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
There is a second path of moderation that could be taken in future 
international negotiations. In contrast to the Hague Conference’s aim to 
achieve a global convention, a future effort might instead pursue a series 
of bilateral or multilateral agreements.110 Though the payoffs are less, it 
likely would be simpler to find agreement among two (or a few) rather 
than the seventy-plus countries that currently are members of the Hague 
Conference. Such an approach may be particularly promising where there 
are conflicts with one or only a handful of countries in a discrete field of 
law. This aptly describes the current problem of libel tourism: the handful 
of instances where it has occurred have all involved lawsuits from the 
United Kingdom.111  
3. Academics and Politicians 
Third, and finally, it may be wise to give more thought to what types of 
people ought to populate the delegations tasked with coming to an 
international agreement regarding judgments.112 The main actors in the 
Hague Conference were academics, not politicians. This is not surprising 
insofar as the fields of jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgment 
enforcement typically are viewed as largely technical in nature. But as the 
first Hague Conference showed, different countries take vastly different 
approaches to these subjects, and these differences reflect substantial 
cultural differences about which countries feel strongly.113 Academics 
might not be the people best suited to negotiating a solution to such 
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entrenched differences across countries because professors do not typically 
have well honed political skills. Because politicians and diplomats generally 
have superior political skills, they perhaps should play a more prominent 
role in settling on an acceptable general framework that the academic 
experts then could be asked to operationalize. To be sure, academics still 
likely would have to be involved in the first stage of framework 
articulation because the choice among competing frameworks itself is quite 
technical.114 For the same reason, politicians or diplomats would have to 
invest significant time to master the issues if they are to meaningfully 
negotiate. 
On the other hand, the success of the Max Planck Institute’s and ALI’s 
intellectual property projects may suggest that academics can come to 
agreement. It is hard to know, however, how much can be generalized 
from the intellectual property experience insofar as both groups had only a 
few carefully selected members. At the very least, however, the apparent 
success of the Max Planck Institute and ALI projects underscores the 
point that more thought should be directed to who should serve on the 
committees that are tasked with drawing up any future conventions or 
agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
The SPEECH Act is systematically and categorically parochial: a foreign 
defamation judgment is domestically enforceable only if the foreign court’s 
exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction is consistent with American due 
process and the defamation liability is at least as protective as American 
First Amendment doctrine. Further, the SPEECH Act is surprisingly 
broad: it applies to all foreign defamation judgments — even defamation 
claims by non-Americans against non-Americans for defamatory acts that 
occurred outside of the United States.  
This Article has argued that the Act’s unqualified parochialism is 
normatively undesirable. Foreign defamation judgments based on laws that 
an American polity could not have enacted due to the First Amendment 
may be “Un-American,” but they cannot be unconstitutional. Nor would it 
be unconstitutional for an American court to enforce an Un-American 
foreign judgment. Whether such judgments should be enforced is a policy 
                                                          
114. For example, judgment enforcement agreements generally must also address questions of 
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decision, and a wide range of foreign policy approaches conclude that 
some (perhaps most) Un-American judgments should be enforced.  
The political branches are better suited than courts, on institutional and 
democratic grounds, to decide which Un-American judgments should be 
enforced. The SPEECH Act, however, demonstrates the dangers of 
formulating policies that directly affect other countries in the purely 
domestic institutional context of statute making. Rather, such decisions are 
best made in a setting in which all affected countries are present so that 
competing interests can be aired and differences can be negotiated. The 
Hague Conference’s past failure to adopt a convention regarding foreign 
judgments does not mean that future agreement is not possible. An array 
of alternative approaches to that taken by the Hague Conference could be 
taken to negotiating a future agreement concerning the enforceability of 
foreign defamation judgments.  
 
